University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 13
1980

In Memoriam: Talbot Smith
Donald P. Lay
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appealsfor the Eighth Circuit

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Donald P. Lay, In Memoriam: Talbot Smith, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 225 (1980).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol13/iss2/2

This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

IN MEMORIAM: TALBOT SMITH•
Hon. Donald P. Layt
Dear Senator Hart:
For many years I have regularly made a systematic
study of the decisions of our State courts as reported week
by week in the national reporter system of the West Publishing Co. Some 5 years ago my attention was attracted
to some opinions of Judge Talbot Smith, then a recently
appointed judge of the Supreme Court of Michigan. Since
that time I have followed his work with much interest. I
have no hesitation in saying that his work stands along
with that of Judge Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, ar:id Chief Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court
of Illinois. I also have no hesitation in saying that the work
of these three judges has stood out along with that of Mr.
Justice Cardozo in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and of Judge Learned Hand in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in the progress of American
law. Indeed I should feel that Judge Smith ought to be on
the bench of the circuit court of appeals. But at any rate
he is eminently qualified in every way for a Federal judiciary appointment. It would be a serious loss to the administration of justice if his appointment were not confirmed.
He is preeminently the type of judge who should be upon
the bench of our highest courts.
Yours very truly,
Roscoe Pound 1
My goal this evening is first to reflect upon Talbot Smith's life
as an unusual and gifted person and second, to underscore his
career not so much as the judicial giant he was, but as a tremendous witness and teacher to all mankind.
As many of you know, Judge Smith was a graduate of Annapo• Excerpts from an address given to the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association, Detroit,
Michigan, June 16, 1979.
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
1 Letter from Roscoe Pound to Senator Philip A. Hart (Jan. 27, 1962).
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lis and served several years in the Navy before graduating from
Michigan Law School in 1934. One of his first ambitions was to
teach law school. He commenced his teaching career at the University of Missouri, where he taught at the law school from 1937
to 1941. Those early roots were to pull him back to Missouri in
1970 when he assumed senior status and volunteered his services
as an appellate judge on the Eighth Circuit. During his close
association with our court Talbot often fondly recollected his
teaching days working with young people. Talbot never gave up
the cloak of his early teaching profession; his later distinguished
career as a jurist constantly set forth written examples for us all
to follow. His many opinions reflect a continuing concern for the
general well-being and happiness of the individual, as well as for
the legitimate interests of institutions within both the public and
private sectors.
I know of no other jurist who could "tum a phrase" as artistically as Judge Smith. But this humble, gracious man was not just
a writer of artistic prose. It should be obvious that what Judge
Smith passed on to us in work power was not only a philosophy
concerning the law but a discipline concerning life itself.
As a jurist, Talbot was not a slave to abstract legal maxims,
rather he applied the experience and common sense gained
through his diverse careers and contact with people.
This pragmatic discernment is found throughout his legal writings. For example, he wrote: "The law, then, has many meanings.
It refers to many different kinds of things, just as the word music
does. There's not much similarity between Beethoven's Fifth
Symphony and the Yellow Cat Blues, yet each is called music by
many people though not without violent dissent from a few." 2
Writing on stare decisis, he once observed: "Isn't enforcing a rule
when the reason (or it is gone something like hanging your hat on
a hook when the hook is gone? You can't in real life. Should you
be able to in the law?"3 Another favorite passage should hold
meaning for us all: "It is well for the lawyer to remember, always,
if he should tend to become dogmatic and intolerant, that today's
axioms may be, tomorrow, merely the quaint sayings of those who
thought the earth was flat."'
Talbot's legal writings reflect a deep and abiding faith in the
law as moving and evolving standard to cope with the conflicts
of changing interests. His philosophy of the law is embodied in
the following passages:
• T. SMITH, LAWYER 8 (1961).

• Id. at 36.
' Id. at 167.
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So, we come face to face with a stark truth: The law is
a living thing. It has roots. It grows, and it dies. Old
branches are lopped off by storm, and by man, and new
growth takes their places. You must be aware of it as a
living thing. In the past will be found its roots. Hence you
must study certain kinds of history. In the present you
find its soil and climate. . ; . Its future growth will be
shaped by forces now at work, the rainfall, the winds; and
the sunshine . . . . Actually, reviewing afresh a field of
law after the passage of a few years is like revisiting a
once-familiar garden. When you return, after a substantial time, some of the plants will have died, some withered, and others grown sti:ong and possibly dominant. . . . Of only one thing in the law may you be sure:
Change. 5
In challenging the law student, Judge Smith spoke:

Your study of the law, then, must comprehend the past.
It must also include a study of the dynamic forces now at
work, the great aggregations of business, of labor, of powerful central governments, and of the increasing awareness
of the dignity of man himself, without which none of his
institutions has dignity . . . .
But regardless of the path you choose, if you keep faith
with the law you will keep faith with yourself and your
fellow man. If you keep your oath as a .lawyer, your days
will be full of excitement and reward, your nights full of
rest, your years full of honor, and your name full of respect. I have, you will note, said nothing of money. Thus
l give the subject the space it should have in a lawyer's
scheme of things. 8
Then he added:
But riches beyond the power of description will be
yours. You will give strength to the weak and tongue to the
terrified. You will walk with honor on one side and integrity on the other and you will know their warmth and their
companionship. Finally, when the wheel comes full circle,
you will look back and you will see, with the vision granted
those who will shortly need vision no more, flashes of pie' Id. at 51, 178-79.
• Id. at 51, 125.
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tures in rapid succession as the reel winds back. You will
see distress relieved and suffering solaced and endeavors
aided and ambitions realized, all through the work of your
mind and your hands and your heart. In that moment you
will be glad and proud that you have lived. The earth can
give you no greater reward. 7

As to his lofty view of the judicial officer he observed:
I want to put before you a vision: The Judge our people
should have. He who listens with his heart, as well as his
head. The Judge who weighs the sins of the malevolent,
the sins of the wise, the sins of the crafty on different
scales than the sins of the helpless and the weak. The
Judge who sees the bench as an altar, rather than a
counter, or a ladder. The Judge who respects the mother's
need, and the dignity of her barely coherent pleas for
mercy for the boy who has taken the wrong turn in the
road, the girl on whom society has turned its back. The
Judge who can hear the faint whisper of the fatherless
above the road of industry.
This judge often seems to walk alone. Never, for him,
will come the cheers of the crowds. Those who remember
him control no crowds, no airways. But though he signs
alone, in his dissents, he is not alone. He walks with a
great unseen host. Cardozo, Holmes, and Brandeis sometimes fall in step with him in his solitary vigils through the
dark thoughts pressed upon him. Far from being alone, he
is attended night and day by those powerful forces of good
which so long for expression in all, but find it, for reasons
beyond human control, in so few. 8
I stated I would not extoll Talbot's virtues as a judge. I pause
with exception. I think two of the most outstanding legal opinions
written in Anglo-Saxon law appear in the Michigan Reports. For
sheer reading excitement I invite you to examine them in their
entirety. In Wycko v. Gnodtke,' Mr. Justice Smith discarded the
archaic doctrine that the only damages parents could obtain for
the wrongful death of an infant child must be based on monies
contributed by the child to the parent. After tracing the ancient
'Id. at 187.
• Speech by Justice Smith entitled The Philosophy of Dissent As Applied to the Courts
(March 27, 1956), reprinted in T. SMITH, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE ... JUSTICE TALBOT
SMITH DISSENTS i, vi (1956).
' 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
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and evil history of the rule he wrote:
That this barbarous concept of the pecuniary loss to a
parent from the death of his child should control our decisions today is a reproach to justice. We are still turning,
actually, for guidance in decision, to "one of the darkest
chapters in the history of childhood." Yet in other areas
of the law the legal and social standards of 1846 are as
dead as the coachman and his postilions who guided the
coaches of its society through the dark and muddy
streets . . . .
What, then, is the pecuniary loss suffered because of the
taking of the child's life? It is the pecuniary value of the
life. We are aware, of course, that there are those who say
that the life of a human being is impossible to value, that
although we will grapple mightily with the value of the life
of a horse, of a team of mules, we will stand aloof where a
human is concerned and assign it no value whatever. This
kind of delicacy would prevent the distribution of food to
the starving because the sight of hunger is so sickening.
But we cannot shirk this difficult problem of valuation. In
the cases coming to us a life has been taken and it is our
duty, as best we can, to put a fair valuation on it. In so
doing, we will keep in mind that the act is remedial in its
character and our duty is to construe it liberally in favor
of the beneficiaries. 10
In Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 11 Justice Smith, writing for the
majority of the Supreme Court of Michigan, reversed a lower
court decision which had taken away a verdict for a seven-yearold boy whose eye was put out when struck by a golf ball on a golf
course, holding that he was a trespasser and thus could not recover.
And yet, if a defendant baits traps with stinking meat
and thus lures a trespassing dog to destruction, the defendant had been held liable [citation omitted]. There
seems to be here a valid (and perplexing) analogy. The
theory is that one is liable if he lures something to its
destruction. In the case before us, a great city maintained,
in a densely populated residential section, a park-like
area, a golf course, with ample lawn, trees, and "a little
11

11

Id. at 337-38, 105 N.W.2d at 121-22.
351 Mich. 230, 88 N.W.2d 596 (1958).
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creek." Upon this area, in the summer, children entered
daily. They were drawn to it for purposes of play as naturally as the dog to the bait. The city of Detroit knew this,
knowing it the only way a "city" can know anything,
through the knowledge of its employees, servants, and
agents . . . .
We will assume that the infant plaintiff, like the dog,
was a trespasser. The dog's owner, nevertheless, recovered
for his loss. The boy, according to the trial court, is to get
nothing. What kind of law is this? Is there a real difference
in the cases? . . . If duty is born of danger, the duty of the
city of Detroit, knowing that children frequent a certain
area, is clear. 12
Although I was only priviledged to know Judge Smith in his
twilight years, in that short time he has left me a lifetime of
lessons. Notwithstanding his failing health, one heart attack after
another, one hospitalization after another, his indefatigable courage to continue his self-imposed judicial responsibilities will
never be forgotten.

11

Id. at 233-34, 240, 88 N.W.2d at 598, 601.

